11
Frivolity,
Dialectical Materialism and Science
How Pofessor Efremov and I explored some of the ideas touched
upon in the preceding chapter will come out later in some of
our conversations and letters. But while these are serious
matters, they fail, for the most part, to catch the important frivolous side. Frivolity is, of course, somewhat harder to get at because culture and
language are high hurdles to humor, as I had found out earlier. Only the
"put down" joke seems to be universal.
In the US it has been Polish jokes, Jewish jokes, and Texas A and M jokes. The Russian counterpart of
the last comes out in Armenian radio
jokes. Someone calls the Armenian radio station and gets an inane
answer. Professor Efremov had a seemingly
endless supply of these with which he regaled my wife and me when we were in Moscow together. At a lunch in his apartment . . .
Efremov:
"On a remote collective farm in Kazakhstan the
wind kept blowing out candles and oil lamps at night. Children
worked in fields all day, couldn't study their lessons and
were growing up ignorant. What to do?
"Called Armenia radio.
"Armenia
radio say, 'Simple, when is daylight, shut off room and trap light, so children can study in it after dark.'"
But he also had a more sensitive sense of the ridiculous.
He delighted in some drawings of a very fine
artist and paleontologist, Professor A. P. Bystrov of Leningrad.
Efremov`s son and daughter, like Bystrov's and most others,
when young tended to get out of line. Efremov's reins were
tightly drawn. To help out, Professor Bystrov sent a series of drawings he had done to keep his children in line. Some of these
Efremov sent me, although they were
too late to help with our brood. He told me it would be all right to reproduce them and I have done so as an example of what he found amusing (Figures
28, 29).
I sent him a "comic" book of our little
swamp "people," portrayed by Kelly in "Pogo." He didn't see
anything to them at all, which was much the
same as my reaction to most of the humor in the Soviet magazine of humorous
political commentary Krokodile.
Then, too, more serious conversations can take on a
light twist. One time, in the late stages of a homemade feast at Dr. Chudinov's
apartment, when we had gorged on delicious pel-meni — bite-sized meat wrapped
in a dough blanket and prepared with a special Uralian
touch — copious amounts of fruit, bread, vodka and cognac,
our conversation drifted over into comparative literature.
"There
are good French writers, good American writers and even good British
writers," pontificated Professor Flerov in
his deep voice, "but there never was a good German writer!"
General agreement around the table.
"But
there was, you know," I chided him.
"Who?" came back a loud chorus.
"Karl Marx," I offered.
"He was a Britisher," Flerov came back, amid
laughter.
"What do you know about Marx?" someone
challenged, implying that Americans probably had never heard of him.
"I've read a lot about him and his works," I
said, fudging a bit on the quantity.
"Where?"
suggesting that his works were banned in the United
States.
"Oh, in the books my kids brought home from school." My
reply was met with polite disbelief, but no one was rude enough
to quiz me about Marx. It was too much, so we dropped the whole thing.
These pleasant interludes to the daily grind over old
bones were fun, and lightened my preconceived ideas of how I would get along in the Soviet Union. Very rarely, except in one-on-one conversations
with Professor Efremov, did serious matters get onto the
table. I shied from discussing such matters and so did my friends. But all the while the matter of the feelings of the Russian scientists on evolution continued to plague me
when ever I would put aside the comfortable feel of
old fossil bones. So I put some of my questions in letters to Efremov, hoping
he could clarify matters for me. After I had
returned from a visit to the Soviet Union in 1961, I initiated a long
interchange on this matter.
|
Figure 28. Sketches by
Professor A. P. Bystrov of Leningrad, from a series sent to Efremov as examples
of an "old time" way of keeping his youngster in line. Bystrov was a leading
vertebrate paleontologist who did outstand ing
work in opening up the modern field of paleontology in Russia. |
Dvinosaurus
|
Figure 29. The "maiden and
the beast." More whimsey sent to Efremov from Professor Bystrov. Dvinosaurus,' an amphibian, is from the
famous excavations of Bystrov on the Dvina River in the northern Cis-Uralian
part of the Soviet Union. The
maiden is unidentified. |
Chicago, January 31, 1962
Dear Professor Efremov:
Recently I have been reading
various Russian books on evolution and species and am beginning
to develop a feeling for something that I should like your opinion on. I have
read, in particular, "Studies ot Species"
by K.M. Zavadsky and "The Theory of Sexual Selection" by L. Sh. Davitaschvili.
My reaction is that the second is
heavy and ponderously written with not too much to
offer and that the first is "fresher" and is written with a much more facile concept of the subject and
matters in general. I have, of course,
read various other general works.
Now, what seems to emerge is a very strong impression
of pervasive Darwinism. Of course, all modern
evolutionary thought has strong Darwinian ties, but what I seem to be feeling
is something much more basic than
this — the feeling of the well-spring, the inner sanctum and so forth. I do not mean that this eliminates thinking as such, but provides what all of us must have in
one form or another to produce some sort of basic guiding pattern. First, my
sample is small; I may be way off in my estimate. Second, if this is not
entirely true, does any social pervasiveness
emerge? I am inclined to the affirmative.
If you have any thoughts on this I would like to hear
them. I try continually to gain a basic
philosophical understanding of our science and interpretations of the
implications. This strikes me as something well worth doing. In this regard,
have you read "The Structure of Science"
by Nagei? It has some interesting material, but as often is the case I find the
biological section somewhat unsatisfactory.
Your devoted friend,
Sincerely,
Everett C. Olson
The substance of this letter did not bring a
direct reply. Perhaps it was a victim of the
two-way filter system that sometimes seemed to have been in operation.
Most of the matters did come out in later letters. As usual, I had used
somewhat cryptic and ambiguous statements
to avoid censors and not to put
Professor Efremov in a difficult position. He rarely failed to read in the proper meaning. What I was wondering
about at this time was my general
impression that the Lysenko doctrines depended on one small part of
Darwinism, that which some have termed
Neolamarckism, or roughly the inheritance of acquired characters. Darwin, especially in his later attempts to explain evolution, did, it is true, invoke this
idea more strongly in his
evolutionary thinking. In our current sense of Neodarwinism, this so called
Neolamarkian concept is in fact essentially
"anti-Darwin." It is this part of Darwin, some feel, that is the
underpinning of the prevalence of Darwin's name in Russian evolutionary literature. As far as Lysenko
doctrines are concerned this is to a
large degree true. But usually it is the use of quite pure, classical Darwinism that is generally encountered. The response in a letter of Efremov's that
did reach me answered my query on The
Structure of Science in typical Efremov style.
Moscow, February 15,1962
Dear Professor Olson:
I was glad to hear from you in your peculiar Russian,
peculiar but charming, for I really have missed you.
And I must reproach you for your enormous, magnificent and undoubtedly very
expensive book-you have sent me, about lost
civilizations. You gave me enormous help
(in your country you cannot evaluate it really) with regular send ing of
many and various books and now I have a much better under standing of your SF
and other courses of recent literature. So don't send me expensive books and please go on with the cheap ones.
But to my horror we haven't
received any copies of your book about the Permian in America and Russia! What is the matter. When have you
send them to me and Dr. Chudinov and others? I have a strong apprehension that someone took your own advice and
have had to steal all these books.
Why you, of course, have send these books second class mail and the scoundrels steal them. So none of us have your work and I am tired by moans and groans of Dr.
Chudinov, who needs your book this
very moment, very badly because he now work on some fantastical
compilations.
The Structure of Science
I have also read but I think the author is dazzled
and dizzied by the advance of physical science and mathematics. In some ways
this book is harmful, especially because the author wholly lacks the
dialectical method of thought. I expect many maliciousnesses from the formal
logic and other formal methods because our
whole world is strongly two-sided, and they haven't the skill of the use of dialectical philosophy (of
course, I don't mean the so-called "dialectic" in political
matters). I have become more and more convinced that our civilization with
formal thought goes more and more wrong
ahead to some disastrous things. But I hope before to go a long way home ....
About more tranquil things. Have
you got A. Comfort's "Darwin and
the Naked Lady?" It seems to me that you are somehow shy about such a title a search of this book is irrelevant with
the Professor's dignity, but I cannot resist my
curiousity.
And please, if it is possible,
send me the "Photography Annual" for 1962 and 1963. Maybe it is possible to steal a copy from office or airport somewhere?
As ever, your very friendly,
I.A. Efremov (Old Efraim — grizzly bear)
The matter of stealing was a standing joke.
Earlier, my wife, while in a dentist's waiting
room, found a three year old copy of National
Geographic which Efremov badly wanted. When I asked her where
she got it, she explained she had stolen it, technically
true. Several copies of the book titled Late Permian of the USA and USSR had been sent registered and finally did come back as rejected — the USA and USSR in
the title was, I expect, too much. I sent them again, registered air mail, and they went through with no difficulty,
only greater
expense.
After this the matter of dialectical materialism simmered and died out
in my work until about 1966. During this period Efremov continued his sociological comments in other contexts and some of these come out in our dialogues in
later chapters. In 1966, Professor
Davitaschvili, a prolific book writer, sent me a recently issued book entitled Coвpeмeннoe Coстояние Эволюционного Учения на Западе (The Status of Evolutionary Thought in the West). It was in his rather ponderous, to me somewhat Germanic, Russian, but not too difficult to read. Understanding it in places was another matter. Davitaschvili was an
old-time paleontologist from Tblisi, Georgia, and immensely widely read. We met just once for a short while. After a quick
go-through of the book, I dismissed it as more or less trash. On the second reading, I began to wonder what prompted all this "nonsense." Within days
of delivery of the book from
Davitaschvili I received a second copy, from Efremov. This prompted me to initiate a long series of
letters on the matter, for I had
decided to comply with Davitaschvili's request that I review the book.
Chicago, September 28, 1966
Dear Professor Efremov:
Not long ago I received the two
books and pamphlet that you were kind
enough to send me. Before I received the books from you, Professor
Davitaschvili had sent me his book on "The Current Status of Evolutionary
Thought in the West." He asked me to review it. So I have been reading it
and have just about finished. Naturally this will not be a book that would be
too popular here or in much of western Europe. That is fine, for we need much
more interchange of different concepts. There is no question that there is a
great deal of local ingrowth in all areas in
all fields. The immediate reaction to the book here, I am sure, would be
"Oh God, that sort of nonsense!" It would be put in the same
lower drawer as Goldschmidt's "hopeful monster" ideas and so forth. This is not because Darwin is
not very highly regarded here, but
because of the general concept that there is one and only one way that
evolution can be understood and that this way has implications that go far
beyond objectivity, which, oddly, is the same
criticism that is made much of in what is thought of as the West by Davitaschvili.
I don't react this way since I
have a "failing" of open-mindedness, which irks some of my
associates. I tend to see both or many sides of questions. Now I do want to review this book and will do it. Just in
what
manner I don't know just yet. Probably it will be a factual account of what is said. Yet it will certainly be necessary to
include some commentary. It is in
this area that I am somewhat unsure.
I don't know if you are in
physical shape to answer some questions for me.
If you are not, please don't even think of trying. I am writing on the chance
that you are for you are the only one I know who can give me objective opinions
and who is fully aware of the issues involved.
Question 1. How well thought of
in Russia is Professor Davita-schvili? I have met him and found him pleasant
and have read a good deal of his work. He appears to me to be a widely read,
paleontologi-cally oriented biologist, one who probably
has certain deficiencies in contemporary
evolutionary studies, as they pertain in particular to recent DNA and RNA studies. I respect him highly
but he seems to have something of the
aura of the grand "oldtimer," How far off am I in this judgement? How do his contemporaries and
the younger men in the Soviet Union judge him?
Question 2. My contemporaries in this country and some
parts of Europe felt the impact of Lysenko very strongly. I note that there is almost nothing in the book relating to this, which
seems to have had a very strong
influence in your country. Is this because these concepts are now largely discounted, or are there other
reasons?
Question 3. This is the most
important and most difficult to phrase. In later parts of
the book, the basis for criticism of the "synthetic theory", or his
"Post-Neodarwinism", becomes clear. In being based on mechanistic materialism, Davitaschvili states, this theory (the Synthetic theory) cannot encompass in simple
terms some aspects of evolution. In
particular it finds difficulties in interpretations and explanation of "directionalism" and in the face of
these difficulties, finds it
difficult to avoid a finalistic or idealistic approach. This is my paraphrasing of what I think is said in
many places in the book, but made clear in next to the last chapter. Darwinism,
which is somehow equated with dialectical materialism in fundamental philosophy
, can be understood only under this
philosophy, as I interpret what is
said. Classical Darwinism has all the answers to evolution. Now I am
aware that Darwin was knowledgeable with respect to Marx, but I find it hard to see that in his class position in the social
structure of England during the early and middle portion of the 19th century
the germs of dialectical materialism were in his own work. Now then, is it to be understood that his work can
be fully appreciated only under this
philosophy, which began in his time, but certainly came to flower and fruition much later than when
Darwin was maturing his ideas? I am asking this as a serious question and one
on which I would like your opinion.
In this same vein, Davitaschvili
says that western scientists, while contributing
enormously to factual aspects of biology, cannot entirely appreciate evolution because they do not understand
dialectical materialism. Now,
any criticism that I might raise could be countered in this way: that I don't understand the philosophy and thus can't be a critic Probably I don't, although I have read as
widely as time has permitted in attempting to do so. Could
you very plainly indicate to me in what
manner this philosophy very objectively gives an explanation of directionalism that does not in the end
fall into the same problem of ultimate explanation as any other
explanation, such as that of mechanistic
materialism? This is probably a big order. But it is critical and I don't feel it is answered in the book.
Question 4. This gets to the
final question, call it 4, although it relates to the last. I quite agree as will most scientists in this
country, and as Davitaschvili recognizes and emphasizes, that
no aspect of metaphysics can logically be introduced into scientific work per
se. Where this is done in explanation of
evolution, we have departed from the
realm of science. I quite agree, as well, that any dogma which limits the realm of operation in study is
inhibiting. But, in a somewhat dialectical way, I have just reached the
heart of the problem. If there is any one way to truth, this way is necessarily
dogma, whether it depends on some
metaphysical guidance, some intuition, or some series of basic premises empirically derived, or some set of independent a prioris. In one way or another we
must arrive at an explanation of our framework, be it one of order or one of
chaos. If we arrive at it and
consider it the way, then how does any single basis escape being dogmatic or
becoming dogma?
As I understand it dialectical
materialism finds its base in a particular set of relationships that are in
essence basic premises which, just as the
order of which I have spoken, may have empirical justifications but which similarly cannot be explained by the simple
statement "that is how it is." In other words, at
some level there must be a set of undefendable
premises or axioms. All that we do thereafter, empirical observation included, depends on these axioms. As
far as I can see all systems of
thought must have some such base, a base beyond which they cannot penetrate without violating the
limits set by the premises. Now it
seems to me in suggesting the various ways of thinking about and studying evolution that Davitaschvili
has taken up, all must fail within
this context. Those that desert a materialistic base go beyond in a
metaphysical abandonment of science, which casts them beyond the pale of scientific investigation. When a vitalistic or
finalis-tic tendency creeps in, this
is what it does. It arrives at the time when he limits of explanation,
under the premises, have been exceeded. Specifically with regard to
directionalism, since it has been a puzzle under
synthetic theory, some have certainly tended in this direction.
But how
does directionalism under a dialectical materialist phi-losophy avoid this tendency, if it does not go beyond
the basic prem-ises in which, as I understand it, a
materialistic basis for changes in direction,
specified or unspecified, exists? I am perhaps wrong as Davitaschvili would suggest, in my understanding,
but does not the social implication
of this philosophy involve not only a directionalism but a very specific
and infallible aspect of this directionalism?
As you can see, this is asked in good faith. I am most
anxious for an interpretation from one who knows this area well, as I know you do. It is not in this sense an impertinence, which it
could well be considered if you did
not know me well.
With
deep regards,
Your friend,
Everett
C. Olson
-----------------------------------------------------
3In
a "post-Lysenko" scholarly book, N. P. Dubinin, whose work was suppressed
during the time of domination of the Lysenkoites, makes this clear, contrasting
Darwinism as strictly materialistic dialectic with Neolamarck-ism,
which is considered nondialectic (Dubinin, N.P., Evolution, Populations and
Radiation, Atomizdat, Moscow, 1966, pp. 190-191). The book came out and Efremov sent it to
me as this correspondence was going on, but I had not seen it at the time of this letter.
A note about the "Lysenko Affair" may
be in order here. Lysenko was an
"agriculturist" who developed some "new" concepts
to hasten the growth of crops during years in which the food crisis was severe. These were basically crude and depended, as
they were developed, both upon spurious "genetic" theory and to some
extent falsification of results. This work, with the eventual help of a "state philosopher," was given an
aura of correctness under the superimposition of dialectical materialistic concepts. Through a series of
political manipulations in the 1930s
and 1940s the concepts gained the full support of the Presidium and of Stalin, and became the prevailing doctrine,
not to be countered. The upshot was, in effect, that not only did agriculture suffer seriously but the
field of genetics, which had been
strong in the Soviet Union, went into eclipse. The best of the biological scientists were, in very large part, excluded from science and many were
"lost," some left and some clearly died in concentration camps. The
name of Michurin, an obscure
horticulturist, later became applied to the doctrines — as Michurinism. Only in the mid-1960s did an
effective recovery begin.
But back to my letter. To ask for answers to
all of my questions was a big order. I am sure, had I written
inquiries along similar lines some years
later, I might have taken a somewhat different approach. The letter, however,
elicited a very long reply which I am
including in its entirety because it brings out so many things critical to Efremov's whole consideration of the role of dialectical materialism, things deeply
ingrained in his thinking.
Dear Professor Olson:
Your second letter, date October
7th [sic], arrived with amazing speed (however quite normal for normal
circumstances) after a week delivery which I
believe is an indicator of warming relationships. But first
letter, dated September 28, arrived only yesterday.
You must not feel guilty with
your questions. I shall answer you much more questions if I
will be able to do so.
Question 1. Prof. Davitaschvili is far off the
whole appreciation here. During the thirties
and forties he occupied a very orthodox position in the line of the regime and Lysenko and bring many difficulties to the more broad-minded paleontologists.
Thereafter we named him "Davite
shval" [smash the trash is the exact translation], for clear flunkyism. But, of course, he is a very
"vast reading man" and much more acquainted with world
literature than any of our other paleontologists,
especially on generalized books and generalized pamphlets. From the other side he is only a cabinet worker
(office worker) and knows very little
about field explorations and geology as real geology. You have
truthfully mentioned that he also is outmoded in all new horizons open by new branches of biology with
applications of molecular biology, biochemistry, geochemy and many
others.
Partly in answer to your second
question, L.Sh.D. was in the late forties an eager follower of
Lysenko's dogma but now has written several pamphlets against the latter in the
name of Michurin, who as a creator of the
new path in biology is quite a mythical figure I believe and when lived never pretended to be more than a
good selectionist as L. Burbank, for
example. By the way how many perfect old sorts have been awfully damaged by unskilled introduction of the new ones and enormous doses of ignorance among Michurinists?
Question 3. You perfectly clearly have formulated the essential
in the position of the line of
criticism in the book in question. The dialectical point of view of Davitaschvili's book on my sight is very weak and formal, being formulated only in words and also
seems like a mystical force.
The "directional" way in your use of terms
(orthogenetic is old name I am more accustomed) is in my
opinion necessary for every deeply experienced paleontologist because all the
materials in our hands cannot be explained in another sense. But among all of
our scientists (Davitaschvili included) it
seems to me, boldly said, that only
I endeavor to explain the orthogenetic way of evolution in dialectical sense. The others openly ignored such
enterprise and mentioned the
"dialectical materialism" only as a general "Word." It
seems to me that the general physical environment of life act as a
"corridor" whose parameters are the "limitized" and
"pushed on" forces of the evolutionary
process as a whole. The goal, because the essential feature of living
organism is the constancy of inner conditions (homeostasis) without which all heredity and the work of the
biological machine is impossible, is the freedom from the environment as
widely as possible. More freedom — more storage of information, etc. This
struggle for freedom if regarded integrally
is aristogenesis by Osborn or aromorphosis by Severtzov. The
orthogenetic (directing) corridor of general
physical environments is nomogenesis by Berg if regarded as the only
possible way in evolution (integrally). To the Neodarwinist the adaptability of evolution to the environment
as well as the selective process
leading to complexity and high fitness is clear, but without the
"bridge" to the general target and therefore without understanding of
the mechanism as a whole process. Really I believe this "mechanism" is quite a dialectical one:
the necessity accomplished through the sum of causalities.
Necessity here is the freedom from environment
and causalities are adaptations.
Therefore in organic evolution
we have a plan (a predestined one) instead of blindness (or rather randomness)
of the process itself. This is also a dialectical point of view —
the two sides of the whole or the unity of the contrary. Of
course, the historical chain to the general goal ended on earth in Rezent, but such is our scientific way of collecting knowledge. I doubt that this is quite
understandable to you in my inadequate English,
but if you understand the general trend of thought it may be of some use to you.
In the Davitaschvili book are
only recommended for "western scientists" to understand dialectical
materialism. But to accomplish such understanding through
quotations from Marx or Engels is a hopeless task because the very
"matter" today is infinitely more complex than a century ago. I
believe you may openly criticize this recommendation, however, the clearance of
"weak" points in western theories is very useful for every paleontologist and for this target
Davitaschvili's book may be highly
recommended. But as for understanding the method of "dialectical materialism" the author accomplished
none on my view.
I believe that recently only
three evolutionary students whom I appreciate very much, you,
A. S. Romer and G. Simpson. The latter is,
strange to say, very similar to Davitaschvili only on the other side of
the line of truth. He, as many formal thought scholars, ignores all opposite
events if they appear beyond the field of narrow investigation. Davitaschvili ignores all opposite facts if
they cannot be packed in a
prematurely generalized trend. From another point of view "dialectical
materialism" is a very old philosophical trend, which in occult books regarded as the "Great Mystery
of Duplicity (or Double)." The attempt to regard every fact or
event as a sum of two opposites from the two
sides in the same moment is of course much higher than formal, linear logic but
infinitely more difficult and therefore possible only for outstanding minds. The dialectical line of thought also
includes historical aspects of all
events and this is the cause that the paleon-tological and geological
investigations appear more dialectical than other
sciences without the historical basis.
The cardinal difference between dialectical
materialism and dialectical non-materialism
lies in the "Primo Motore" [i.e., the general cause
of events]. If the "Primo Motore" is a result of pure material events
in accordance with general physical laws, then this view is materialistic. If "Primo Motore" appears
to be unrecognizable and somehow beyond the general laws of the material
world then it is "vitalistic,"
"reactionary," and "unscientific."
One more example. The very wide
use of Marx's formula: "existence (mode of) determines
the conscience" in this form is really a metaphysical one, because it
lacks the other side: "conscience determines
the mode of existence." Now it comes to the Marxists very slowly
that spiritual conscience is a quite real force especially in the fitting, survival and "way up" in wholly
materialistic processes. By the way,
if spirit is the highest form of matter, what then? Why cannot it be a real force and inevitable "other
side" in a dialectical world?
As you can see, all this agreed
with your considerations about the question
4, because true scientists cannot operate with any dogma, because axiomic answers to all questions are religion,
non-science. A scientist also needs
"homeostasis" but only adaptable to the rapid alternated knowledge and if knowledge came upon the
exponents this adaptability must also be
rapid ones. Therefore only direct explanation of the discoveries by the dialectical way of thinking has a scientific value. So one must have very good brains to be
able to do so. If not, we must bear
with the formal one-sided views.
Between us girls, I have two heretical views for the
professional scientist. The whole process
of obtaining knowledge is dialectical (two-sided). Scientists on the one
side explain the new by the ortho-doxal old.
Others (on the other side) explain the old and new facts and events by the invented and mysterious
"metaphysique." Both compose a unity of polar opposites and
our knowledge progressed between them as I attempted to show in my romance [The
Razor's Edge]. Only the strong minds have ability to find this
razor's edge
immediately.
My second thesis is this: the
universe now appears so infinitely complex
that we can discover everything [note, I believe he intended anything], and
can predict many discoveries! We can predict correctly really
all if we only formulate the event with a satisfactory clearness and within the general parameters of the physical
universe. It is similar as to cutting something from a snow wall — we
can master every figure desirable from the cube to Aphrodite. So I haven't
valued the so-called "predictions" articles in recent science because
there are millions of this stuff and success
with one or another prediction not at all verifies that this way of
investigation is the only truthful one.
As a result of unexpected
(expected by dialectical philosophy) complexity of the universe is that the formulation obtained became more and
more undigestible and useless. We drown in the deep ocean of facts and experiments and the proud tower of
science more and more became like the Babel tower. Gradually ruined from
within by utter ignorance of the scientists
themselves, 240,000 pamphlets in chemical science every year, 90,000 in
physical and so on and speedily up! We are
the last scientists in the good old sense of this word ....
But enough of this babel! You must have a strong head, I fear to be able
to read such stuff.
Resume. I think your opinion about this book is a
correct one. It must not be easily laughed
off because of contain useful critical aspects on many "theories." But the recommendations given are weak be cause of too generalized a formulation which is of
no use on concrete material.
I have just sent you three
books. One by Semenov, about the origin of Man is essentially typical for Davitaschvili's line with much more flunkyism and citation. You may find it interesting as
example of the newest and serious book which is really an "old song"
dogmative and metaphysical,
entirely abandoning the second level of evolution of man — spiritual. The "herd" — this only he sees on the early
stages of evolution.
Your friends as always,
I.A. Efremov
P. S.:
Please let me know about receiving this letter as soon as possible!
Chicago
December 2, 1966
Dear Professor Efremov:
The Komsomolskya article on the "Dialectic in
Science" arrived and is most opportune.
I am still stewing about the whole problem, the problem of how I and my
colleagues of the "west" really think about evolution. We are not consciously dialectical, but in a way I don't
know how this subject can be otherwise conceived, for surely there is a duality and it would seem that what is
critical is whether or not this
dualism plays a role in thinking or whether there is a dual linearity with little cross-relationship. I think
that the whole matter is in no way
simple and that categorization of an area of cultural continuity as this
way or that loses sight of the variety present and that, furthermore, this variation goes right down to the
individual as he thinks on one thing
or another.
Thanks for the new books you sent me. The one on the
origin of man sounds a lot like some of our
anthropologists but with a different dogma in the background. It seems
to me that it is characteristic of many who work in this area to take some
simple, conceptual framework, believe it works without question and base
everything on it. It builds some mighty
towers but I have an uneasy feeling about the base. Of course, in a way,
all science does the same, accepting some basic
axioms and some limitations, but beyond this there is an empiricism which I miss in most writings on man and
society.
When I do finally finish up what
I am trying to write on the matter of
Professor Davitaschvili's book and others related, I would like to send
the paper for comment. Do you think this would be a good idea and do you have the time and energy to look it
over? I would not need the copy back, but would like your comments. If you
think it is a good idea, please say so.
With my best wishes,
As always, your friend,
Everett C. Olson
Moscow, January 8,1967
Dear Professor Olson:
Now to
answer your questions:
1. Of
course I will be glad to look over your article about Davitaschvili. At any rate send me only a third or fourth
copy to void the evil of no returning.
2. I agree
with you completely on your evaluation of Semenov's book. The same, half-fanatical tendency but on
diametrically opposed grounds.
3. My "Razor Blade" [The Razor's Edge] you
cannot obtain. I like your idea of a dialectical trend of thought as two
intercrossed lines of opposed linear thoughts. By the way, my taphonomy
is based on the opposite side of
sedimentation of the geological chronicle — the process of destruction.
In other words — the other side of the medal, as we say here. It is very interesting to take a look on the other side
many of your forebearers may have
overlooked.
As ever, cordially your friend,
I. Efremov (Old Efraim)
This letter was the last of the series related
to The Status of Evolutionary Thought
in the West by Davitaschvili. In his letters Efremov, of course, was dashing off his ideas as they
came to mind, without the caution he would have used in
publications. In his fictional writings, some
of his unorthodox ideas are better expressed through the vehicle of
his characters in other times
and other
places.
I did finish the paper and sent it to Efremov. He
made some corrections and predicted "some furs
will fly." The paper appeared in Evolution
as a long book review. In it I tried to explain dialectical materialism and did not, I now feel, emphasize
sufficiently a main theme of Davitaschvili, that Synthetic evolutionary theory, or what he called
Post-Neodarwinism, could end up in idealistic thinking. Idealism, of course, is
a complete anathema to Marxist
doctrines, an abstraction that alienates
explanations from the basic materialistic reality. The Marxian "flip-flop" of Hegel bore
precisely on this point. Efremov brought
this out in noting the "lack of a bridge" between the major
aspects of Neodarwinian theory, the "random" changes through mutations and the directing effect of
natural selection. Ihis now seems to
me to have been the main theme of the book and what Davitaschvili was writing about when, in a review of my review, he complimented my effort to understand
dialectical materialism, but noted
that I had been only partially successful Having obtained some understanding of this point of view the complex
web of Efremov's thought, I found my perspectives enlarged and my
skepticism about the completeness of the ex-planatory
aspects of Synthetic theory somewhat increased.
My rather mild worries about the sufficiency of
the Syn-thetic theory did not arise in a dialectical context. Rather some aspects of the fossil record did not seem readily
explainable by it, a position held by others
but rarely expressed after the middle 1940s except
by a few "radicals." I expressed my reservations in a paper presented at the Darwinian Centennial at the University of Chicago in 1959 ("Morphology, Paleontology and Evolution," in Sol Tax, ed., Evolution after
Darwin, volume 1, pp. 523-545). I had been
asked to read all the papers, as someone who was at hand as they arrived, and write what I thought was needed. I did in a sort of "whoa, let's step back and take a
look" paper. The synthesis was in its
heyday of popularity at the time.
My paper was not enthusiastically received. The
problems of adaptation lay at the base of my skepticism, involving such things as: (1) the existence in the past of seemingly "adaptive monstrosities;" (2) vast parallelisms in development of morphological complexes in evolutionary lines only remotely related; (3) mass extinctions at various times in the fossil
record, involving many different kinds of
organisms; (4) long temporal sequences in fossil
lineages in which major changes are persistently directional, often seemingly nonadaptive in their initiations and with no evident environmental stimulation.
As George Simpson said to me, rather
pleadingly, all of them can be explained under the synthesis. It does require reaching pretty deep. Since 1959, some points have been resolved, but
most are still puzzling to me.
Simplistically, the synthesis involves natural
selection of variants in a population. The variants result from
differences in the genetic constitution of
the immediate forebears, by mutation or recombination. Selection preserves the
most fit (survival of the fittest) and
thus modifies the genetic composition of
the succeeding generations. Slow accumulation of changes set the pace of
gradual evolution. There can hardly be doubt that this is one aspect of evolution, but the question of whether or not it is a sufficient explanation of all
change remains and has been of
increasing concern to some evolutionists during the last 15 or 20 years.
Dialectics, as Efremov applied it, could allow a
fresh look at some of these problems, a look he sketchily outlined in his letters
but never formally published. Where, then, does this leave matters? I spent many hours during 1971 talking with Professor
Efremov about these and other matters. I had hoped to continue in later years, but his death in 1972 precluded this. As far
as science is concerned, only added emphasis and some clarification of the ideas expressed in his letters emerged. He noted
that in his opinion about 99 percent of the Soviet scientists did not follow dialectical materialism,
although it was such a significant
part of their education that some of its tenets probably remained in their subconscious. About one
percent of the scientists, however,
did accept dialectics, and these, with a few exceptions, did not really apply it properly. The tragic and dangerous situation of the world, which Efremov
felt strongly, was due in some large
part to the dominant position which linear
logic had achieved.
Dialectics, he maintained, is not a law, but an expression of the basic structure of the universe, and thus
all evidence, necessarily materialistic,
must be viewed as dialectic. Both formal
religion, in which the "reality" is an abstraction of God or the
equivalent, and the materialistic so-called "reality," are harmful to science and hence to mankind. Once the
truth of the concept of contrasting and interacting opposites is understood, the great problems of science — that is,
the basic conceptual problems — begin to fall into place. Man has
emerged as an intelligent organism by a
dialectical spiral of evolution in which
the balance of physical and psychic, both materialistic, have interacted. Wherever intelligence has or
will emerge in our universe, it will
be in the guise of creatures morphologically similar to man, but suited to their own particular environments. These
were his main thoughts, greatly condensed.
Many persons, of course, do not go along with this and Efremov fully recognized one's choice to see things
otherwise. Dialectics represents, as he has
said, a way of looking at the sciences that have
historical contexts, geology, paleontology, astronomy and so forth. I had found it strange that so few scientists in
Russia operated within a dialectical framework in a nation
where this was "state doctrine." I was surprised also that
those few who did seemed to be in large part sterile. One simple explanation is that "hard"
science is necessary, and because
symbolic logic and consequent mathematics are necessary, even though "linear," the basic
dialectic philosophy must be put aside to accommodate these linear
essentials.
An interesting final footnote to
this matter of dialectics is to be found in the volume
that resulted from the First Biometric Conference
in Biology and Medicine, sponsored and directed by Professor P. Terentjev (1961), a Leningrad herpetologist. This includes
an essay by the State Philosopher A.E. Popov. Biomet-rics, dealing with probabilities and logical mathematical solutions,
was slow to develop in the Soviet Union, even though some of the world's greatest mathematicians have
been Russians. The "philosophical" statement legitimized the
work of the participants in the conference,
or rationalized it, if you will, as follows. Full reality exists only in the
temporal context of dialectical materialism. At a given time, however,
with the flow stopped, so to speak, a powerful solution of immediate problems
is to be found in a mathematical, statistical treatment. This has a strangely Bergsonian flavor. The
"slice of time" reveals only
partial reality. What emerges is not total truth, but heuris-tically is an appropriate treatment of limited
problems, therefore perfectly
legitimate.